Sunday, March 9, 2014

RUSSO-CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN 2014: DIST FORCES RUSSIAN ARMY

TO: FIELD RECON
FROM: COC AOR
SUBJ: WHERE ARE THE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS?

THE BEST SCENARIO FOR DEVELOPING A PLAN TO PINPOINT LOCATION OF RUSSIAN UNITS OPERATING IN THE FIELD IN THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA WOULD BE TO UTILIZE A PREVIOUS DEPLOYMENT, SUCH AS THE GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008. IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH WHO IS WHERE, AS SEEN IN THE FOLLOWING MAP:


SIMFEROPOL: THE FIRST UNITS TO ARRIVE CAME IN ON SEVERAL AIRLIFTS IN IL-76 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. THE UNITS WOULD MORE THAN LIKELY HAVE BEEN THE AIRBORNE ONES, IN PARTICULAR, THE 7TH AIRBORNE DIV, THE 76TH AIR ASSAULT DIV AND THE 98TH AIRBORNE.

SEVASTOPOL: ASIDE FROM THE SHIPS IN THE HARBOR, GROUND UNITS APPEARED OVERNIGHT AND IF THEY WERE LOCAL RUSSIAN FORCES, THEY WOULD HAVE TO CO-ORDINATE THE TAKEOVER WITH HIGH-COMMAND, PROBABLY THE 58TH ARMY, WITH HQ AT VLADIKAVKAZ. THIS IS WHERE PUTIN, THE PRIME MINISTER DURING THE GEORGIAN CAMPAIGN, CO-ORDINATED THE MOVEMENTS AND ESCALATION INTO THAT COUNTRY IN 2008.

IN ORDER TO DO THAT, SPECNAZ WOULD BE THE MOST LIKEABLE CANDIDATE, THE ELITE RUSSIAN SPECIAL FORCES.

KERCH: THE FERRY TERMINAL ITSELF WAS PROBABLY ISOLATED AND CAPTURED BY COMPONENTS OF THE 58TH ARMY SPEARHEAD UNITS, MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENTS SUCH AS THE  19TH AND 42ND DIVISIONS. THAT WOULD ENABLE THE BULK OF THE GROUND FORCES, THE 58TH ARMY ITSELF, TO BE TRANSPORTED ACROSS THE KERCH STRAIT EITHER BY THE FERRY BOATS OR BY AMPHIBIOUS LANDERS, TO TRAVEL INTO FEODISIYA AND ON TO SIMFEROPOL. THIS WAS PEOBABLY THE CONVOY WITH MOBILE KITCHENS SPOTTED AND FOLLOWED BY REPORTERS TWO DAYS AGO.


BORDER: OTHER UNITS THAT MAY BE OPERATING, UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE 58TH ARMY, ARE THE 135TH AND 693RD RIFLE REGTS AND THE 33RD MTN BRIGADE, POSSIBLY ON GUARD DUTY AT REMOTE OUTPOSTS, CHECKPOINTS AND BIVOUACS ALONG THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.


DIST ALL CH VIA TXT, TT,.....GPX....




RUSSO-CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN: INSIGNIA IDENTIFICATION

TO: FIELD RECON
FROM: ID DIV
SUBJ: WHO'S WHO IN THE CRIMEAN TAKEOVER

THE FOLLOWING UNITS HAVE BEEN SPECULATED BY VARIOUS SOURCES AS BEING THE SPEARHEAD OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY ADVANCE INTO THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA THE FIRST WEEK IN MARCH, 2014.

BELOW, FIND THE ASSAULT FORCE USED TO CRUSH THE GEORGIAN MILITARY IN 2008 AND IT APPEARS TO BE THE SAME JUGGERNAUT. THE INSIGNIAS FOR THE UNITS IN QUESTION APPEAR IN THE INCLUDED IMAGE.

[NOTE ALSO THE CURIOUS COINCIDENCE THAT PM PUTIN WAS AT THE BEIJING OLYMPICS IN FIRST WEEK OF AUGUST WHEN GEORGIA INVASION BEGAN.  IT WAS PM PUTIN WHO CALLED THE SHOTS FROM THE 58TH ARMY HQ IN VLADIKAVKAZ]

(GEORGIAN CAMPAIGN SOURCE:   http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1069.pdf)


58TH ARMY-- VLADIKAVKAZ
19TH & 42 MOTORIZED RIFLE DIV (SUBORDINATE)
135TH &   693RD MOTORIZED RIFLE REGT.  (SUBORDINATE)
503RD MOTORIZED RIFLE REGT (SUBORDINATE)


76TH AIR ASSAULT DIV--PSKOV//ST. PETERSBURG
104TH & 234TH  REGT. (SUBORDINATE)

98TH AIRBORNE-- 48TH INTEL---MOSCOW

33RD SP MTN BRIGADE

42ND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIV
70TH & 71ST MOTORIZED RIFLE REGT. (SUBORDINATE)

N CAUCASUS VOLUNTEERS

CHECHEN EAST-WEST BN

7TH AIRBORNE--NOVOROSSISK

10TH & 22ND SPECIAL FORCES BRIGADES (SPECNAZ)

TOTAL 35-40,000


COMBAT AIRCRAFT--SU-24, SU-25, SU-27,  TU-22

BLACK SEA FLEET--MOSKVA,  SMETLIVY




ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAVE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN QUANTITATIVE BOOTS ON THE GROUND, THE QUALITY OF THE FIGHTING MAN IN THE RIFLE REGIMENTS COMPARED TO THE COMMANDOS AND SPECIAL FORCES UNITS MIGHT DIFFER VASTLY. IN ADDITION, THE EQUIPMENT MIGHT NOT BE UP TO PAR AND THE DIFFERENCE IN TACTICS WAS SHOWN IN MANY OF THE GEORGIAN CAMPAIGNS TO FAVOR THE WESTERN EQUIPPED ARMORED HARDWARE VERSUS THE OLD SOVIET GEAR USED BY THE RUSSIAN ARMY.


ADVISE FOR ANY RECON-INTEL TO CORROBORATE UNIT IDENTIFICATION



RUSSO-CRIMEAN COUNTERPUNCH SITREP #0309M

TO: AOR UNITS
FROM: COC
SUBJ: STAGING AREAS

COSISTENT WITH LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN AN EFFORT TO DISLODGE OCCUPATIONAL FORCES ION THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA, CONSIDER THE HELICOPTER BASE AT KHERSON AS A REAR STAGING AREA AND THE FORWARD STAGING AREA LOCATED AT GENICHESK AIRFIELD.

OBJECTIVE ALPHA TENTATIVELY SLATED AS DZHANKOI AIRFIELD SINCE ENEMY STRENGTH IN VIC WEAK.



DIST ALL VIZ CLASSSIFIED AS AOR READY DOC.......COMMAND...

RUSSO-CRIMEAN COUNTERPUNCH: SECONDARY STRONGPOINT

TO: AOR
FROM: COC
SUBJ: KHERSON HELICOPTER BASE.

A MORE ADVANCED AIRFIELD IN SOUTHWESTERN UKRAINE IS LOCATED AT KHERSON; THIS AIRFIELD SHOWS SIGNIFICANT FACILITIES AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR A COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATION OF THE RUSSIAN TAKEOVER OF THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA. BUILDUP AT THIS POINT AS A QUASI-REAR ECHELON STAGING AREA WOULD WELL SERVE ANY OTHER FORWARD OPERATING BASES AS CAN BE ESTABLISHED SUCH AS THE DIRT RUNWAY AIRFIELD AT GENICHESK.



SDIST ALL FIELD UNITS AOR....ASAP W/FOLLOWUP....

RUSSO-CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN: THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPTION

TO: AOR
FROM: COC
SUBJ:  UKRAINE'S ADVANTAGE

EXPERTS ARE QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO CAPITULATE TO OVERWHELMING RUSSIAN FORCES CURRENTLY CAMPED ON CRIMEAN TERRITORY.. THE RUSSIAN MILITARY HIGH-COMMAND HAS GIVEN THE UKRAINE ARMY AN ULTIMATUM TO PULL OUT OF THE CRIMEA OR FACE CONSEQUENCES. THAT MIGH BE JUST WHAT THEY NEED TO DO.

A COUNTEROFFENSIVE POSTURE NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KIEV APPARENTLY DOESN'T HAVE THE RESOLVE TO CHALLENGE THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZED MOVEMENT IN CRIMEA.

HOWEVER, THE NORTHERN FRONTIER IS STILL WEAKLY DEFENDED BY THE RUSSIANS, LIMITED TO A FEW BORDER GUARD CHECKPOINTS AND A BIVOUAC DETACHMENT THAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN HASTILY CONSTRUCTED NEAR SIVASH.

THE UKRANIAN ADVANTAGE LIES ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER. THERE IS ONE AIRFIELD,  THOUGH ABANDONED, THAT WOULD SERVE AS A FORWARD STAGING AREA, LOCATED AT GENICHESK, ON THE NORTHEASTERN UKRAINIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER. THE RUNWAY IS DIRT, BUT IS AN IDEAL LOCATION FOR WHATEVER PLANS THE UKRAINIAN COUNTER-THRUST MIGHT EMPLOY IN THE AOR.

ANY EFFORT TO RETAKE THE PENINSULA WOULD PLACE THE RUSSIAN ARMY ON NOTICE THAT IT IS IN FOR A FIGHT AND HIGH-COMMAND MAY WELL RECONSIDER JUST WHAT THE OBJECTIVE IS IN THE CAMPAIGN.

DIST ALL CH VIA TXT....

THE RUSSO-CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN: PR AND LOGISTICS OF THE OPERATION.

TO: G2
FROM: BACK
SUBJ: THE RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE

It may have come as a surprise to many that the Russian military would engage in a foreign occupation campaign, but it is worth considering just what was exactly at stake before President Putin gave marching orders to his units.

A brief summary of the campaign will show that there may have been a plan in the works to take the peninsula according to a blueprint. The harbor was blockaded, the Simferopol airfield became the center of operations as more than a dozen IL-76 transport planes brought the initial ground forces into the region.

Smaller objectives were then secured; border checkpoints in the north, the ferry terminal at Kerch. All of this points to a well-planned operation that, if executed swiftly, would bring on no resistance. In fact, that is exactly what happened. However, in any operation, getting in is easy, getting out isn't. Certainly the Russian high-command would prefer a referendum and annexation in order to legalize its occupation; with the added bonus of absorbing the Ukrainian military units still active, but on stand down, in the region. This would enable the Russian army to withdraw, leaving a token force in its absence, with the Ukrainians footing the bill for security. But what if this doesn't happen?


View CRIMEA CONFLICT 2014 in a larger map

Currently, the cost of fielding an army isn't cheap and in the case of the Russian, they are probably the last ones capable of sustaining the campaign for a protracted period. In Afghanistan, it's costing the Americans anywhere from $500 to $750 million daily to sustain a force twice the size of the Russo-Crimean occupational units. In terms of military structure, the units in the field in Crimea may be considered the size of a reinforced brigade or by an extended analysis, a division. This force is basically not strong enough to maintain security should a shooting war erupt and it would have to be beefed up.

Currently, the method employed is via convoy from across the Kerch Strai and up the highways into the field positions. Recent reports assert the Russians are bringing in mobile kitchens and field hospitals, including ambulances. However, the furthest any sizable unit has been able to push north toward the border is the Gvardeyskoye airfield near Simferopol and the units have already been in country over a week. Aside from a few checkpoints and bivouac camps along the northern frontier, the Russian have no real control of the immediate AOR, posing a major dilemma for a tactical advantage; they are vulnerable from the north.

15 BILLION RUBLES A DAY

The cost in rubles to sustain its forces in the field, comparable to Allied forces in Afghanistan, would amount to about$400 million per day and there is no guarantee the lines of communication are adequate to keep the men in shelter, clothing and food. The military thus will be handing the Russian government an invoice amounting to 15 billion rubles a day to maintain its army in the field.

Thus, Putin is in a quandary so his strategy immediately shifted to the so called "referendum", in effect twisting the local authorities arms in order to get them to vote on secession from the Ukraine. His military campaign is thus directly tied to his public relations campaign to persuade the people to join the Russia Federation. The Russian army will not be able to sustain itself for more than a few months in the field and will rely heavily on local resupply. This brings on the inevitable insurrection, underground movement and sabotage associated with any military occupation. Putin has but one alternative if the referendum fails, to bend to international pressure and sanctions, and pack up and go home.


DIST ALL CH VIA WW, TT....